In a reflective and richly entertaining piece from 1979, Doug Hofstadter playfully imagined a conversation between ‘Achilles’ and an anthill (the eponymous ‘Aunt Hillary’), in which he famously explored many ideas and themes related to cognition and consciousness. For Hofstadter, the anthill is able to carry on a conversation because the ants that compose it play roughly the same role that neurons play in human languaging; unfortunately, Hofstadter’s work is notably short on detail suggesting how this magic might be achieved1. (...) Conversely in this paper - finally reifying Hofstadter’s imagination - we demonstrate how populations of simple ant-like creatures can be organised to solve complex problems; problems that involve the use of forward planning and strategy. Specifically we will demonstrate that populations of such creatures can be configured to play a strategically strong - though tactically weak - game of HeX (a complex strategic game).We subsequently demonstrate how tactical play can be improved by introducing a form of forward planning instantiated via multiple populations of agents; a technique that can be compared to the dynamics of interacting populations of social insects via the concept of meta-population. In this way although, pace Hofstadter, we do not establish that a meta-population of ants could actually hold a conversation with Achilles, we do successfully introduce Aunt Hillary to the complex, seductive charms of HeX. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of the language used when teaching mathematics to young children. It proposes that an important part of the teaching of a mathematical concept is the introduction of specific terminology. Children may need to be taught new meanings for already familiar words. The timing of these introductions to new words or meanings is critical to their understanding of the concepts being taught. It will be argued that there are two aspects of the children's learning that need (...) to be considered. First, their understanding of the concept being introduced, and secondly, their learning the appropriate word to describe that concept. By assessing children's understanding of new mathematical concepts through their own use of the terminology, the teacher can then negotiate new meanings with them through practical experiences, introducing new word meanings only when the concepts have been understood. (shrink)

Viewed in the light of the remarkable performance of ‘Watson’ - IBMs proprietary artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language - on the US general knowledge quiz show ‘Jeopardy’, we review two experiments on formal systems - one in the domain of quantum physics, the other involving a pictographic languaging game - whereby behaviour seemingly characteristic of domain understanding is generated by the mere mechanical application of simple rules. By re-examining both experiments in the context (...) of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, we suggest their results merely endorse Searle’s core intuition: that ‘syntactical manipulation of symbols is not sufficient for semantics’. Although, pace Watson, some artificial intelligence practitioners have suggested that more complex, higher-level operations on formal symbols are required to instantiate understanding in computational systems, we show that even high-level calls to Google translate would not enable a computer qua ‘formal symbol processor’ to understand the language it processes. We thus conclude that even the most recent developments in ‘quantum linguistics’ will not enable computational systems to genuinely understand natural language. (shrink)

Viewed in the light of the remarkable performance of ‘Watson’ - IBMs proprietary artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language - on the US general knowledge quiz show ‘Jeopardy’, we review two experiments on formal systems - one in the domain of quantum physics, the other involving a pictographic languaging game - whereby behaviour seemingly characteristic of domain understanding is generated by the mere mechanical application of simple rules. By re-examining both experiments in the context (...) of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, we suggest their results merely endorse Searle’s core intuition: that ‘syntactical manipulation of symbols is not sufficient for semantics’. Although, pace Watson, some artificial intelligence practitioners have suggested that more complex, higher-level operations on formal symbols are required to instantiate understanding in computational systems, we show that even high-level calls to Google translate would not enable a computer qua ‘formal symbol processor’ to understand the language it processes. We thus conclude that even the most recent developments in ‘quantum linguistics’ will not enable computational systems to genuinely understand natural language. (shrink)

Intentaré primero decir qué significa "progreso" y "progresismo" en el uso que habitualmente se hace de estos términos hoy ; trataré, en segundo lugar, de ofrecer los referentes fundamentales que componen la idea de progreso para, desde ahí, hacer ver la incoherencia de ciertos progresismos hodiernos ; a continuación presentaré el vínculo histórico entre la idea de progreso y la religión judeo-cristiana. Entonces veremos el proceso de secularización moderno y su mentalidad progresista como una "mundianización" (legítima y ambigua al tiempo) (...) de la visión judeo-cristiana del mundo y de la historia. Al final, ofreceré alguna reflexión sobre lo que considero legítimo e ilegítimo en la actitud progresista. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Circularity and the Micro-Macro-Difference” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: I reconstruct two core notions, “observation” and “objectivity,” in order to raise some questions regarding their interpretation and relevancy for the target article’s main thesis. The main concern with “observation” is that its scope and applicability are not clear, while the notion of “objectivity” could be in conflict with other concepts and assumptions accepted by the author.

L'A. se penche sur la pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin pour en lever les ambiguïtés apparentes, notamment au sujet de l'âme. Il définit cette dernière comme forme du corps mais elle subsiste en elle-même. Comprendre se fait sans organe corporel en la conversio ad phantasma. L'abstraction appréhende la forme pure et aussi l'essence avec la matière commune. La substance est à la fois individuelle et universelle. La conversio ad phantasma décrit l'abstraction initiale. L'A. définit ainsi aussi l'intelligere, la ratio et (...) l'intellectus en en levant les ambiguïtés. Saint Thomas d'Aquin passait facilement d'un ordre à l'autre, essentiel ou existentiel, parce que dans sa vision hiérarchique de l'univers chaque unité se transcende vers une unité ultérieure jusqu'à ce que Dieu soit atteint. (shrink)

Contemporary meta-dogmatic legal discourse has frequently mobilized the signifier “translation”, in different stages and to face diverse problems ─ the multidirectional interactions between _legal language_ and _ordinary language_, the plural network of (national and international, state and non-state) legal orders, the dialectics between presupposed legal materials and practical controversies, the intersubjective place of the judge as the impartial _third_, the invention of exemplarity as _concreteness ─_ always however with decisive projections in the understanding or experiencing of _juridicalness_ (its aspirations, categories (...) and limits). The purpose of this paper is to explore the claims to inter-semioticity which the mobilization of this _signifier_ and the plurality of its contexts of meaning and performance seem to construct. This means, on the one hand, to resume the dialogue with Boyd White _(justice as translation)_ and François Ost _(le droit comme traduction)_. It also means, on the other hand, returning to the counterpoint between _translation_ and _tradition_ which MacIntyre’s _narrativism_ exemplarily proposes (_Whose Justice? Which Rationality?)_, this time to discuss the relevance of treating Law (a _certain_ Law) as a cultural artifact, i.e. as a non-universal (culturally plausible and civilizationally moulded) answer to the universal (anthropologically necessary) problem of the institutionalization of a social order (law as a form of life, as a project and as a tradition). With an unexpected helping hand coming from Greimassian’s semio-narrative, this means also asking if _translation_ (or the ethics of humility it celebrates) can actually be experienced, in our limit-situation, as the _resource_ (if not the _place_ or the _environment_) of a plausible _intercultural dialogue_. (shrink)